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“It was not only difﬁ  cult for him to understand 
that the generic term dog embraced so many unlike 
specimens of differing sizes and different forms; 
he was disturbed by the fact that a dog at three-
fourteen (seen in proﬁ  le) should have the same 
name as the dog at three-ﬁ  fteen (seen from the 
front).…Without effort, he had learned English, 
French, Portuguese, Latin. I suspect, nevertheless, 
that he was not very capable of thought. To think 
is to forget a difference, to generalize, to abstract. 
In the overly replete world of Funes there were 
nothing but details, almost contiguous details.”
—Jorge Luis Borges, “Funes the Memorius”
W
e are told scientists are 
divided into experimentalists 
and theoreticians. The 
dialectic description of the dynamics 
of science, with one tribe gathering 
data and collecting evidence and 
another tribe providing form to these 
observations, has striking examples 
that argue for the importance of 
synthesis. The 16th century revolution, 
which settled the way in which we see 
the sky today, is probably one of the 
best examples of how comparatively 
ineffective each of these tribes can be 
in isolation. Tycho Brahe, the exquisite 
observer, who built, calibrated, and 
reﬁ  ned instruments to see in the sky 
what no one else could, collected 
the evidence to prove a theory that 
Copernicus had already stated years 
before (in a book he dedicated to the 
Pope). It was only many years later that 
Galileo established the bridge between 
theory and observation; he understood 
the data in terms of the theory and 
thereby cemented the revolution. 
Copernicus’s statements, showed 
Galileo, were not only ﬁ  gments of his 
imagination; they were an adequate 
description of the universe as he and 
Brahe had observed it.
Since my ﬁ  rst steps in biology, after 
a prompt departure from physics 
and mathematics, I have looked for 
such encounters between theory and 
experiment. I began studying the visual 
system and the series of fundamental 
works by Atneave (1954), Barlow 
(1960), and Atick (1992) on the 
relationship between our visual world 
and the way the brain processes it. 
Their research was based on a simple 
hypothesis: (1) the images that we see 
are highly redundant and (2) the optic 
nerve is a limited channel, thus the 
retina has to compress information. 
Compression, redundancy? How do 
such concepts relate to the biology of 
the brain?
In the middle of the last century, 
working on the problem of 
communications, languages, codes, and 
channels, Claude Shannon proposed 
a very elegant theory that formalized 
intuitive ideas on the essence (and the 
limits) of communications (Weaver and 
Shannon 1949). One of its key aspects 
was that, depending on the code 
and on the input, channels are not 
used optimally and thus do not carry 
all the information they potentially 
could. When we compress (zip) a ﬁ  le, 
we are actually rewriting it in a more 
efﬁ  cient (though not necessarily more 
intelligible) language in which we can 
store the same amount of information 
in less space. This compression has, of 
course, a limit (we cannot convey the 
universe in a single point), and the 
mere existence of an optimal code is 
central to Shannon’s idea. Attneave was 
probably the ﬁ  rst to think that these 
ideas could help unravel how the brain 
worked, and in a long series of works 
relating these ideas to experimental 
data, it was shown that the retina’s 
business is mainly to get rid of the 
redundancies in the visual world. 
About four years ago, Jacob Feldman 
published a paper, similar in spirit, 
proposing a simple explanation for 
a long-standing problem in cognitive 
science about why some concepts are 
inherently more difﬁ  cult to learn than 
others (Feldman 2000). An article 
whose ﬁ  rst reference is to work carried 
out 50 years previously makes us 
suspect that an important gap is being 
ﬁ  lled. As in the previous experiments, 
Feldman borrowed a theory—he 
did not invent it—to explain long-
standing and previously unexplained 
research in this area. Feldman’s idea 
was based on a theory developed by 
Kolmogorov that established formal 
mathematical grounds to deﬁ  ne and 
measure complexity. Kolmogorov’s 
theory was focused on categories, which 
are just subsets of a universe, a bunch 
of exemplars that constitute a group. 
“Dogs” is a category in the universe 
of animals. Different statements can 
deﬁ  ne the same category, for example, 
“big dogs” and “dogs that are not 
small” are the same group, and some 
information in the statement may be 
irrelevant because it does not aid in 
determining which elements belong 
or not. In the same way that Shannon 
spoke of a non-redundant code, 
Kolmogorov showed that categories 
could be deﬁ  ned with an optimal (non-
redundant) statement. The length 
of this statement deﬁ  nes a measure 
of complexity termed Kolmogorov 
complexity. 
To visualize the intuitive nature of 
his theory it helps to do a thought 
experiment. Imagine a set of objects 
deﬁ  ned by, say, three features: form, 
color, and size. And imagine, for 
simplicity, that each feature is binary, 
that is, there are only two possible 
cases. Size is big or small, color is 
yellow or red, and shape can be either 
a triangle or a circle. This deﬁ  nes, of 
course, a universe of eight objects. We 
can now deﬁ  ne categories within this 
universe: for example, all the circles (a 
category of four exemplars), or all the 
big and yellow objects (two exemplars), 
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or all the triangles that are 
not red (again two) (see 
Figure 1). We can also deﬁ  ne 
a category by enumeration, 
for example, the small red 
triangle, the big yellow circle, 
and the small yellow circle 
(three exemplars). Some 
rules (and thus the groups 
deﬁ  ned by these rules) are 
intuitively easier to deﬁ  ne 
than others. “All the circles” 
is an easier statement to make 
(and probably to remember) 
than “small circles and 
yellow big objects.” This 
notion of difﬁ  culty is what 
Kolmogorov’s theory 
formalized, stating that 
complexity was the length 
of the shortest deﬁ  nition 
(among all the possible 
deﬁ  nitions) of a given set. 
From this thought 
experiment, we can 
understand the logic of 
Feldman’s paper, which 
showed that. Kolmogrov 
complexity is very closely 
related to our intuitive 
notion of conceptual 
difﬁ  culty. Feldman presented 
subjects with all possible 
categories (of a ﬁ  xed number 
of exemplars) in different 
universes and showed that 
the critical parameter to 
rank the difﬁ  culty of a given 
subset was its Kolmogrov 
complexity. Moreover 
by explicitly presenting 
all the members and the 
nonmembers of a category to naïve 
subjects, he showed that we can 
spontaneously reduce a category to 
its minimal form and remember it 
without any explicit instruction. Thus, 
what Feldman found, following the 
original ideas of Shepard, was that our 
psychological measure of complexity—
our difﬁ  culty in deﬁ  ning and 
remembering a category or concept—is 
also determined by the Kolmogorov 
complexity that describes it. 
This essay is, in a way, about how 
we avoid becoming Borges’s character 
Funes, who could not understand 
repeated observations as exemplars 
of a common rule and thus could not 
synthesize and categorize. Simply, he 
could not think. Probably the most 
disappointing moment of Feldman’s 
paper comes at the very end, where it 
deals with its (somehow unavoidable) 
recursive quest. Understanding 
why some concepts are difﬁ  cult to 
learn may itself be difﬁ  cult to learn. 
Modern mathematics, together 
with Kolmogorov complexity and 
information theory, has taught us 
another fundamental concept that 
may be relevant when trying to 
understand the logic of the mind. In a 
long series of paradoxes enumerated 
by Bertrand Russell, Kurt Goedel, 
and others, we learn that 
a formal system that looks 
at itself is bound to fail. At 
the very end of his paper, 
Feldman writes, “In a sense, 
this ﬁ  nal conclusion [that 
psychological complexity 
is Boolean complexity] 
may seem negative: human 
conceptual difﬁ  culty reﬂ  ects 
intrinsic mathematical 
complexity after all, rather 
than some idiosyncratic and 
uniquely human bias.” Who 
invented mathematics? The 
Martians? On the contrary, 
I believe this result supports 
a more naturalistic and 
less Platonic conception of 
mathematics. Formal ideas 
in mathematics are not 
arbitrary constructions of 
an arbitrary architecture; 
rather, they reﬂ  ect the 
workings of the brain like a 
massive collective cognitive 
experiment. Mathematics 
does not only serve to help 
us understand biology; 
mathematics is biology. 
We are not less original if 
our thoughts resemble our 
mental constructions, we are 
just consistent. It is within 
this loop, this unavoidable 
recursion—mathematics 
understanding the logic 
of the brain—that we will 
have an opportunity to test, 
as some conspire, whether 
among all the wonders 
evolution has come out 
with, the ultimate might be a brain 
good enough to avoid the risk of 
understanding itself.  
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Figure 1. Visualizing Kolmogorov´s Complexity
Intuitive categories can be deﬁ  ned by short statements. The 
universe: circles and triangles, red and yellow, big and small 
(A). Examples of easy categories: red objects (B); triangles (C). 
Example of a difﬁ  cult category: yellow circles and small red 
circles (D). 